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Abstract—5G mobile networks provide additional benefits in terms of lower latency, higher data rates, and more coverage, in
comparison to 4G networks, and they are also coming close to standardization. For example, 5G has a new level of data transfer and
processing speed that assures users are not disconnected when they move from one cell to another; thus, supporting faster
connection. However, it comes with its own technical challenges relating to resource management, authentication handover and user
privacy protection. In 5G, the frequent displacement of the users among the cells as a result of repeated authentication handovers
often lead to a delay, contradicting the 5G objectives. In this paper, we propose a new authentication approach that utilizes blockchain
and software defined networking (SDN) techniques to remove the re-authentication in repeated handover among heterogeneous cells.
The proposed approach is designed to assure the low delay, appropriate for the 5G network in which users can be replaced with the
least delay among heterogeneous cells using their public and private keys provided by the devised blockchain component while
protecting their privacy. In our comparison between Proof-of-Work (POW)-based and network-based models, the delay of our
authentication handover was shown to be less than 1ms. Also, our approach demonstrated less signaling overhead and energy
consumption compared to peer models.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Authentication handover, 5G, Privacy protection, SDN.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE rapid growth of mobile devices and applicationsalong with their processing needs have led to the
emergence of the fifth generation (5G) networks. The 5G
networks have been introduced with properties like higher
bit rate than 10 Gb/s, low latency and increased network
coverage compared to 4G [1]. The 5G networks operate
through heterogeneous cells and expand overlay coverage
[2], [3]. The 5G users, like Internet of Thing (IoT) devices,
vehicles, and mobile nodes, when moving from one cell
to another, make the handover process activated and if
this handover is frequently run, it could lead to a delay
in the 5G network [4]. Following a frequent handover, the
authentication mechanisms become more involved and may
increase the delay time, which contradicts the 5G objectives.
Using inefficient authentication handover could cause per-
formance degradation among heterogeneous 5G cells and
increases the delay. The power and resource constraints
among the Access Points (APs) in cells require low complex-
ity and highly efficient handover authentication procedures
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among heterogeneous and homogeneous cells in 5G [5].
The 5G architecture offers advantages in communication
but has associated technical challenges including, authen-
tication handover, the existence of heterogeneous cells, and
privacy protection [5], [6]. Providing network management
and security services inside heterogeneous cells can be
challenging since mobile users (MU) may leave one cell for
another frequently, and specifically when they are dealing
with financial and data-sensitive applications.
5G requires taking into account the acceptable level
of security in application scenarios and network architec-
ture, especially in validating the facilities and providing
their access level to 4G. Also, reducing the delay is one
of the objectives and characteristics of 5G. An approach
to validate and protect privacy, which is faster, safer and
more effective, is essential for the advancement of the 5G
networks. For 5G, the security requirements are higher in
comparison with previous networks (2G, 3G, and LTE) for
which new solutions are required to provide intelligent con-
trol across heterogeneous cells for reliable mechanisms and
further adoption of the 5G network [3], [5]. Recent advanced
technologies like SDN/NFV and blockchain [7], [8] have
recently received a lot of attention for the advancment of
the next generation of wireless networks.
In SDN, the control plane is separated from the data
plane, and its controlling part can meet the controlling needs
in 5G, as the SDN is a new architecture of the network, with
properties like programmability and flexibility in networks
management for testing new ideas [9], [10]. The infusion of
SDN in 5G is beneficial because, in the future, mobile net-
works would be going towards more scalability requiring
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better management and flexibility [9]. SDN flexibility could
potentially benefit 5G applications, in terms of quality of
service (QoS), machine to machine (M2M) and human to
human (H2H) communications [9]. Applying blockchain,
on the other hand, can also allow us to better respond
to some of the security challenges in 5G [7]. Specifically,
a blockchain is a fraud-resilience, distributed ledger that
records all transactions in a 2P2 network. The blockchain
has a decentralized architecture, and its popularity in cryp-
tocurrency world in securing distributed communication
has been remarkable [11]. Blockchain can play an important
role in facilitating secure communication between mobile
users in 5G, for example by removing intermediaries for
authentication, reduction in transaction cost, and global
accessibility for all users [12]. In other words, we posit that
SDN and blockchain can be combined to facilitate us to
provide enhanced privacy protection and security in 5G.
Bblockchain technology is more widely known in financial
[13] and supply chain applications [14], but its adoption is
limited on 5G mobile networks and mobile services because
of its resource-intensive consensus and validation protocols,
mainly Proof of Work (POW) [15]. POW requires significant
energy and processing time, which is not appropriate for
mobile users, especially on the 5G network [15]. Having
said that, the blockchain should be compatible with the 5G
specification to be effective, and thus, we use an upgraded
Delegated Proof of Stake (DPOS) algorithm in this work.
In this paper, a blockchain-enabled authentication han-
dover approach with effective privacy protection is pro-
posed for the 5G within SDN platform. In the proposed ap-
proach, users obtain a quick and secure connection by elim-
inating re-authentication among handovers operators be-
tween heterogeneous cells with a low delay. Demonstrated
in experimental results, the comparison between authentica-
tion delay with POW-based and network-based models, and
the delay of our authentication handover shown to be less
than 1 ms, making the proposed approach well suited for
5G. In addition, our approach showed to have less signaling
overhead with better energy consumption in compared with
POW-based and network-based models. This was achieved
by applying the upgraded DPOS algorithm, which has been
shown to be scalable and energy-optimized and effective in
reducing latency as opposed to POW.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The pro-
posed architecture of 5G with a heterogeneous cell of SDN
and blockchain on the 5G is described in Section 2. The
blockchain-enabled authentication handover mechanism for
5G is presented in Section 3. The effective privacy protection
in SDN based 5G network is discussed in Section 4. Section 5
defines the DPOS algorithm used in blockchain component.
The simulations results and evaluation are presented in
Section 6. Section 7 presents the related work and finally,
Section 8 gives the concluding remarks.
2 THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE OF 5G WITH A
HETEROGENEOUS CELL
In the proposed architecture, the blockchain and SDN are
introduced into the 5G network to simplify and eliminate
the frequent handover authentication into small cells and
heterogeneous networks. The overall model of architecture
is shown in Fig. 1. The blockchain center (BC) is located in
an environment outside and near the cells or heterogonous
cells and is applied as a space for storing and producing
an encryption of parameters like the device identification,
certification, and unique data related to the device under
the alias. Encryption materials are applied to protect pri-
vacy and security. BC is involved in this architecture as
follows: 1) the initial registration, the new devices require
initial registration when they first want to enter a cell or
heterogeneous network, 2) changing identity information,
devices may change their alias when passing through a cell
to another, thus their encrypts, therefore, BC generates new
encryption for identification and validation in other cells,
and 3) Hostile cancelation, in BC, malicious behaviors are
detected by using blockchain lookup. The identity of the
adversary is publicized once the malicious behaviors have
been confirmed by BC among Cells. The BC is a public
ledger that any MU can register into it, which is approved
and recognized by mobile operators. Only MU who are
known to mobile operators have permission to register in
BC. In our architecture, we used a public blockchain to
facilitate collaboration among various mobile operators who
can select and approve associated MU with the chain in
BC. In the blockchain, any MU can be part of the network
and can have their own private and public keys. Moreover,
all SDN controller candidates can be involved in consensus
mechanism and can also check and validate all transactions
within the 5G network.
Heterogeneous network management and flexibility of
the SDN structure is applied in the proposed architecture
to increase programmability. The SDN controller is pre-
scribed for the overall control cell or heterogeneous net-
work. The SDN switch deals with the data transfer and
behavior change in the network by following the controller
commands. By separating the data plane and the control
plane in the SDN, defining the protocol, functions, and
policy on the 5G network becomes possible [9,10]. The SDN
controllers in this proposed approach are one network and
can communicate with each other and BC, and like Bitcoin,
the information inside secure messages is exchanged as
encapsulated transactions among them. Transactions and
messages from BC can be shared through the dedicated
transfer keys to the controller. Each SDN controller has a
dedicated transfer key received from BC and is applied to
transfer and receive information. Scalability is an important
problem in SDN, and we have solved it through a hier-
archical structure between SDN controller and BC in our
architecture. Not only the SDN controllers are one network
that can communicate with each other (as another layer)
but also they are being managed via BC (as a higher layer).
If any SDN controller becomes down in a cell, the system
will then manage this cell via another SND controller in the
network between SDN controllers. In this architecture, it is
assumed that the data center of the mobile operator has the
information of BC and SDN controllers can be controlled by
mobile operators. The objective is to achieve an effective,
secure and fast mechanism for authentication handover
among the 5G network. In our BC, we have applied the
optimal DPOS algorithm [16] for energy consumption and
speed boosting during transactions.
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Fig. 1. The proposed architecture of blockchain-enabled handover in SDN-based 5G networks with heterogeneous cell
3 BLOCKCHAIN-ENABLED AUTHENTICATION HAN-
DOVER MECHANISM FOR 5G
By applying BC and SDN, a handover mechanism is de-
signed for transmitting the key for authentication in the
5G with eliminating re-authentication among handovers be-
tween cells. Fig. 2 shows the relationship between BC, SDN,
and AP/BS in our approach, and gives the main componets
forming BC including a ledger (to store and maintain data),
Auth Control and Sec info units.
Fig. 2. Relationship among BC and SDN and AP/BS structure in
the proposed 5G network
Initially, the mobile users (MU) are registered in BC to
generate encryption material based on their properties and
then receive the key and encryption properties, and BC
sends a vector containing the MU information to the SDN
of that cell in a simultaneous manner. BC assigns two public
and private keys to each users mobile. As shown in Fig. 3,
the mutual authentication between user and BC occurs in
procedure 1. The MU sends the request of joining the BC to
enter the given cell or domain. This request is received by
the Auth Control unit in BC and sent to the MU after it is
confirmed; meanwhile, another unit in BC named sec info
sends the data of this MU to the SDN controller in that
domain or cell.
In this context, the Auth Control inside BC is applied to
identify the unique MU information like identity, location,
direction, physical layer properties, RTT, and public and
private key assignment.
Through the sec info unit, the messages are sent to the
SDN controller safely in capsuled packages. Specifically, a
set of information from the registered user in BC like the
public key is sent to the SDN controller of that and other
cells.
The SDN controller is responsible for MU management
and defines the invoices for the SDN switch tables in a cell.
It also stores the APs in the cell to validate the key, and the
MU, and then the MU joins the cell. If for any reason the
MU wants to handover from the existing AP to another AP
in the same cell, the existing AP makes the SDN controller
arena and the MU sends the associate request to the target
AP and then becomes disconnected with the existing AP. In
general, the unique characteristics of MU are shared among
current and adjacent cells, thus, there will be no need for re-
authentication when passing through heterogeneous cells.
As to direction and speed, the SDN controller can recognize
the next cell, which in turn informs the BC. The BC checks
the sec info unit to ensure that the MU is a trusted cell.
A handover process between the two heterogeneous cells
for the 5G network is presented in Fig. 3 (Procedure 2).
After registering the MU, BC sends its information to the
SDN controller of the cell and its adjacent cells, which can
be heterogeneous. The SDN controllers in each cell run
MU validation operations on APs. The MU is registered
in the available cell and intends to go to the neighboring
heterogeneous cell that sends the request to the AP of the
same cell. The AP then communicates to the controller and
accepts the MU request as BC has already considered it as a
valid SDN controller in that cell.
The SDN controller informs BC of its position and, after
disconnecting from the current AP, the controller of that cell
is notified. The public key P is known between the MU and
the AP, and it is capable of switching between the APs of
a cell. The private key Q is applied in signing transactions
and decoding data for privacy protection.
An SDN controller in a cell has already validated this
public key among AP or BS. The BC sends messages to other
adjacent public key cells, to eliminate the need for repeated
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Fig. 3. Registration procedures and behavior in a cell
Fig. 4. The process of entering and moving among heteroge-
neous cells in the proposed 5G network structure
re-authentication in these heterogeneous cells. This mech-
anism accelerates the authentication process when passing
through few heterogeneous networks and APs, and reduces
latency. In general, cells receive sensitive information for
this mechanism from sec info. The sec info, depending on
the speed, the direction of travel and the position considers
timeout named T and makes the cell controller aware of
this. The AP based on this T waits for the MU entry or
its displacement among the APs. If T is over and there is
no effect on its request to the AP, there is a probability
of compromise behavior of which the BC becomes aware,
and this follows the assessment of the status of its trans-
actions and even the possibility of blocking, where this
blockages will be reported to other SDN controllers. Specific
user information like IP, physical layer properties, position,
velocity, and direction of movement within the cell are
collected and the SDN configures the flow controller tables
according to the given policy, in a sense that it identifies
the location of the next cell controller, which accelerates the
authentication process and removes the re-authentication
process in entering into other cells, as shown in Fig. 4. An
authentication procedure is applied between the user X and
BC, then, user X join the cell A, which is implemented by
BC-enabled based on the base SDN structure described in
Algorithm 1. Handover authentication does not require any
change in user authentication hardware and, similarly, after
being registered in BC in other adjacent cells in the direction
of the MU, it is run to eliminate the need for repeated
authentication when entering cells B and C, which reduces
the latency, by removing re-authentication. By predicting the
MU route, the SDN controller is ready to serve the MU.
Algorithm 1 User X authentication handover
1: Initial register : User X // in Blockchain Center (BC)
2: User X→ Req authentication and Send info
3: BC→ Send(auth User X info(spec info/ Key))
4: User X: receive (encryption & integrity key)
5: BC →Send(User X vector to Predicted Cell)//SDN controller in near cells
receive info
6: SDN Controller: validated User X //in APs
7: User X→ Associate (State A)
8: SDN Controller→Monitor User X
9: SDN Controller: Message (BC)// send info to BC
10: BC: Message (SDN controller Net) // send info to SDN controllers
11: if (Mobility or migration)
12: if (Possible handover (Target AP)) // in same cell
13: SDN Controller: Message (BC)// send to BC
14: Update(Switch Flow Table)
15: User X→Handoff (current AP, Target AP)
16: else
17: SDN Controller: Message (BC)// send to BC
18: Update(Switch Flow Table)
19: User X→ Handover (current AP, Target AP) // in other cell
20: end
3.1 Managing BC Keys in Handover
The structure and content of BC provide an approach to
managing the key in the 5G heterogeneous cells and net-
works, which in turn reduces key transfer time among cells
for users handover. The focus here is on the BC on the
management of keys in heterogeneous cells to achieve a
scalable and light-weight transfer mechanism through the
BC. The duty of the BC is to remove a third party (interme-
diary) in transactions. Key transportation handshake can be
eliminated by applying the BC mining method, that is, the
messages are approved by the BC instead of the third party.
The BC structure the excess additional units in the
handshake process for validating and authenticating the
authenticity of the previous and traditional methods. The
handshake process according our approach is shown in Fig.
5. The collection period (CP) allows multiple transactions to
be broadcasted to BC, where Tcp is the transactions time
to BC. Signatures are processed in transactions to assure
whether the information in transactions are trusted or not.
By applying the public key, the messages are exchanged
between the user and BC and only the cryptographic trans-
action remains to reach the destination and be opened with
the users private key. As observed in Fig. 5, Tp + Tm contain
the delay emission time and the mining process. Tk is the
transmission and distribution time of the public key among
controllers and the attributed controller key.
In Fig. 5, Ti is the time to send the user’s unique
information and features to the controller. Tcb is the time
to send data from the controller to BC. The key processing
time (Ttotal key) during handover in 5G heterogeneous cells,
which includes public/private key emission for the user and
IEEE TRANSACTIONS JOURNAL, 2019 5
Fig. 5. The key transmission for BC structure
the attributed key to the controller in the BC structure to
support the handover in heterogeneous cells, is obtained
through Eq. (1).
Ttotal key = [Nt× Tcp] + Tk + (Tp+ Tm) (1)
where Nt is the transaction count obtained through Eq. (2).
Ncp is the transmitters’ theories count n is the requisitions
count registered in BC at every m minute. Nt is expressed in
Eq. (2).
Nt =
(n×m)
60s
×Ncp (2)
In Ttotal key, Ti and Tcb are not contributive in transmitting
keys, and are implemented in a co-procedural manner in
the key transfer process. Transactions time collection is
optimized with a minimum of key transfer time.
3.2 Dynamic Key Management in Handover
We should be able to manage keys attributes within BC in
a way that is compatible with 5G goals by the transaction
collection period (TCP). Dynamic key management in han-
dover in 5G cell is achieved by using our dynamic TCP.
To decrement the side effect of variables, the approach of
detection variable is engaged in our scheme.
We consider 1ms for pattern metric to measure the
efficiency of different collection periods. Thus Ttotal-All is
a sum up number of transactions in BC. Nt-1 is the average
processing time in 1ms under different collection periods.
Basing on the Equation (1) and (2), we can derive the
number of transactions on n cells as Equation (3).
Ttotal All = [(Nt× Tcp) + Tk + (Tp+ Tm)]× n (3)
Estimated key transfer time is calculated apply different col-
lection periods. The optimized TCP time is elected according
to the minimum key transfer time. The TCP is presented in
Algorithm 2, where it is applied in the BC for key transfer.
4 EFFICIENT PRIVACY PROTECTION IN SDN
BASED 5G NETWORK
Data privacy implies the right to separate network users
from threats and retaliations against their data. By reducing
Algorithm 2 Optimize TCP
1: BC (Received (TCPi)) // TCP1, TCP2.. TCPn
2: BC = Accounting(mining)
3: BC→ initialize ( SDN Controller )
4: SDN controller→ Announce to BC// Path traffic
5: For (i=0; i¡=n ; i++)// n is number of transactions
6: Call Equation()// Calculate the number of transactions (Equation 3)
7: Calculate (Ti)
8: Call Traffic cell (Pi)
9: Tcp[i]→Tcp
10: End for
11: TcpM = min (Tcp)
12: Return TcpM
13: end
the size of the 5G heterogeneous cells and networks, users
may move among many cells before the communication
session is completed, and may be trapped in non-trust
APs or become compromised during handover. Privacy
protection is a challenge in 5G. The available approaches [5],
[17] for privacy protection apply a complex key agreement,
mutual interaction, by adding signs to protect data, which
could lead to latency, and introduce computational load
encryption and complexity to the AP [18], something not
appropriate for small and low power 5G cells. The multiple
requirements and the existence of the third party as are
considered as a bottleneck in privacy protection, not fit
for 5G. By applying the encrypted keys in BC during the
communication process, if reading a record is sought, the
private key associated with it should be known. In any
situation where the attackers do not have the key, and what
they get is useless.
In our approach, SDN controllers can select multiple
paths for transmitting different parts of the data stream,
according to heterogeneous network coverage. Based on the
applications, some of the network paths are more sensitive
and should be selected. As long as the user is authenticated
and be in the networks coverage, the stream is routed
through the controller of that cell, and decrypts the user data
based on his private key, and then reorganizes the stream
received from multiple paths. The proposed approach is ca-
pable of determining free traffic and network paths through
the SDN controllers, something suitable for the 5G network.
By choosing multiple routes between APs or femtocells
in data transfer, the traffic on the 5G network would be
reduced. The privacy protection mechanism where SDN
and BC are presented in Algorithm 3. In this algorithm, K
Algorithm 3 Blockchain-enabled Privacy Protection using SDN in 5G
1: User A→ Announce to SDN controller// User A wants to send information to
User B
2: If (user A== authentic in BC && trust in cell)
3: SDN controller→ Announce to other
4: SDN controller ( Check other traffic cells)
5: SDN controller→ calculate (optimize (path))
6: SDN switch→ update flow table()
7: User A = Allocate (WK) // allocate bandwidth to user form SDN controller
8: User A→ Encrypt (send data (dK)) // encrypt and send data parts to SDN
switch through AP
9: VK= min (Ts, tr) // size in bytes to be transferred with TS
10: SDN switch→ forward data// base policy
11: SDN Controller = monitordatatransient(User B)
12: User B→ Received (data)
13: User B = Decrypt (data) // using private key and re-organize data
14: else
15: Add to block()
16: end
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is the count of the network paths that the SDN controller
selects for data transfer. The symbol dk is a different data
section that can be sent in K directions in a simultaneous
manner. The symbol tr is the time of data transfer inside
the involved cells. Ts is the delay threshold for 5G appli-
cations. For example, some services like transferring email
that can withstand a long delay or online games with a
slight threshold of delay before Ts is required. WK is the
bandwidth allocated by the SDN controller is in accordance
with the traffic situation of different networks, and VK is the
transmitted data volume in multiple paths with the delay
of the delay threshold application. The count of K paths
here is through the balance between the privacy level and
the complexity of the adjustable system through the SDN
controller. Privacy protection for users is programmable
through the SDN controller, and the advantages of BC are
essential for future requirements.
5 CONSENSUS ALGORITHM USED IN OUR BC
In order to verify and record every transaction in open
blockchains, it has to go through consensus process. POW
[18] has been mainly the consensus protocol used in a many
decentralized platforms including Bitcoin and Ethereum,
which could be problematic in 5G environments due its high
computational power and latency [15], [16].
Also, the original DPOS has the limitations of vulnerabil-
ity to centralization as the number of evidences is limited,
and being exposed to fault of real-life voting. To address
this issues in our approach, we have solved the DPOS limi-
tations [16] in our upgraded DPOS algorithm with the help
of SDN controllers in any cells and the network between
them in the our proposed 5G architecture.
Our mechanism acts like a board of directors where SDN
controllers in the cells vote on a number of SDN controller
candidates, in a sense that they would be responsible for
verification and billing. In general, for constructing each
block, SDN controllers are applied for electing represen-
tatives who would produce blocks based on collabora-
tion. Representatives monitor each others performance, and
when one is out of line is either omitted or does not get
votes. DPOS can reduce the count of the nodes associated
with the authentication and accounting process in a signifi-
cant manner.
In our context, the SDN controllers perform transaction
processing and the addition of a new block to the BC.
When the SDN controllers miners succeed, they can receive
a certain volume of information of their interest as a reward,
indicating that the miner is the processor of the information
he/she is interested in. Miners are nodes that control a large
amount of information on the network, because in each cell
the controller monitors users. It is possible that someone else
would be interested in this information, in this situation, the
user can request from the miner for this information, in a
sense that the miner verifies the access control policy in the
BC and then shares the data. Here, the advantage is that
the user will delete the decryption process after the verifica-
tion. The benefits of DPOS include cheap, scalable, energy-
efficient transactions. A partial centralization in devising
creation of the blocks makes this algorithms functionality
better than its counterparts. Devising a new block in Bitcoin
takes only 10 minutes, while the EOS, by applying DPOS,
do the same in less than one second [16]. Algorithm 4 shows
the mining procedure in our approach.
Algorithm 4 upgraded DPOS Algorithm
1: BC = Get info (H, VB, HPre, tstamp, S, Trans) // BC strat updating and get
require info like, ( H: Block Header, VB: Block Version, HPre: Previous Block Hash,
tstamp: Timestamp, S: number of SDN controllers, Trans: transactions Trans = [T1;
T2:::Tn] )
2: Group Agent = Voting() // select group of agents for mining
3: BC→ Announce (Candidate mining) // sending require info to agent
4: Initialize bool variable K = False
5: Integer P = 0;
6: While (NOR K) do
7: transaction order = random(n) // range [1:n]
8: Calculate ( Merkle tree root (Root P))
9: Root P→ basing on the transactions in payload
10: Create hashed block header ( Hn = VB‖HPre‖ tstamp‖ S ‖ Trans)
11: while (NOR K & NOT got DPOS) do
12: Group Agent→ mining(block);
13: Create header: Hverify= VB‖HPre‖tstamp‖S‖Trans;
14: The string to Hn= Hverify‖nonce;
15: Result = hash(Hn ‖ nonce)
16: Cooperate (Group Agent)
17: Extract nonce = getNonce(Hn);
18: RootP basing on the transactions in Bpayload
19: nonce ++ ;
20: if (NOT got DPOS) then
21: Group Agent→ mining(block);
22: P= (nonce - 1) into nonce field
23: Return (nonce - 1);
24: K= true;
25: else if (receive DPOS) then
26: Group Agent→ mining(block);
27: K= true;
28: return NULL;
29: end if
30: end while
31: end while
32: If (Miner == success) then
33: Miner (i) = Resive data interest ();
34: Share data (Miner(i));
35: } }
36: end
6 EVALUATION AND RESULTS
Experiments are run to evaluate the delay, efficiency, and
comparability of the proposed approach. The results are
obtained through OMNeT ++ 5.1 [19] with the INET 3.6.4
framework. The INET framework, which is involved in
the implementation of the SDN switch and controller, can
support the SDN [20] and the BC function [21]. The BC
encompasses the consensus algorithm (DPOS) for users in
the 5G network. We define certain categories of messages
among BC and cells to help achieve a common view of the
blockchain among all participating MU.
• Ini reg (net id, Loc, Dire, from, phys ly, Rtt, to), Ini reg
ack (peer list): Allows the users to discover BC and
broadcast their information among near cells.
• Get block list (): Request from BC, the list of blocks
available with number of SDN controllers for mining.
• Get tran list(): Request for transactions in the cells
(not yet mined into a block).
• block(block header, tran list)
• block header(hash, timestamp, miner, merkle root)
• tran(in list, out list): Transactions have a list of inputs
in each cell which it is spending, and a list of outputs
which it creates in that cell.
In order to warrant that all MU have a uniform view of
the blockchain, we define and consider the rules followed
IEEE TRANSACTIONS JOURNAL, 2019 7
by the BC so as to get consensus. We define a MU in the
5G cell by the tuple (Ini reg, P, Q, T, firmware), where (P, Q)
is the public and private key pair for the MU, firmware is a
function use defined algorithm in our approach. To evaluate
the feasibility and performance of our proposed model, we
define the following metrics to measure the feasibility of our
proposed model:
• Ttran : Transactions added to the blockchain.
• Tblock : Blocks added to the blockchain per second
by SDN controllers via DPOS algorithm.
To evaluate the comparability of the proposed approach
among heterogeneous 5G cells, a network containing 30
heterogeneous cells with a distance of 200 meters between
the two APs in two cells and the MU with 5KM /h speed
change and direction of every 3 seconds were selected. In
each cell, the controller updates the flow tables of each cell,
based on the parameters of the users who register in BC.
The details of the simulations are presented in Table I.
TABLE 1
Stimulation parameters
Simulation Parameters Values
Simulator OMNeT++ 5.1 with INET 3.6.4
Number of Cell 30
Number of request/response to BC 2000
Number of Transactions 1200
Number of SDN Switch 90
Number of SDN controllers 30
Cell radius 100 m
User mobility speed 5 Km/h
User mobility direction Random
Total number of users 600
distance between two AP 200
Length of packets registered in BC (M) 32 byte
Length of packets from BC to the controller(N) 16 byte
Transmit power (Pt) 1726 mW
Receiving power (Rx) 1340 mW
The influence of the number of miners N =
(
µt = 1500, σ
2 = 4
)
Block Size 4 byte
Transaction Counter 1-9 byte
Block Header 80 byte
Prev block hash 32 byte
Signaling overhead: it contains a pattern or additional
information to enhance performance of the wireless commu-
nications. It is related to registering the MU in BC. This is
to be compared with the network-based signaling overhead
and POW-based models, which use POW [22]. This method
is similar to that of [22]. Here, Eq. (4) is applied for this
analysis.
Signalingoverhead(Sover) =
(B ×M)
t
+
(N)
t
(4)
where t is the time and B is the count of steps between MU
and BC. M is the length of packets registered in BC and N
is the length of packets sent from BC to the controller. As
results indicated in Fig 6, our proposed approach has less
overhead than the network-based and POW-based models
because the DPOS algorithm was applied in our work
together with the SDN controllers for managing each cell.
In the POW-based model where POW is applied it has
extra overhead and does not allow the SDN controllers to be
applied in mining the handover. The network based method
requires the third party in communications and a variety of
authentication servers among heterogeneous cells in a 5G
network. As observed in Fig. 6, an increase in time increases
the signaling overhead because there are more requests for
registration and authentication among cells. Our approach
has less overhead than its counterparts because it is directly
registered in the BC and joins the cell with no need to
interact with other nodes.
Fig. 6. Comparison of signaling overhead of our approach with
the network-based and POW-based models
Energy Consumption: In all subject models, if the trans-
mit rate Ctx is the transmit rate and Crx is the received rate,
the energy consumption is calculated through Eq. (5).
E = (Ctx× Pt× t1) + (Crx×Rx× t1) +
(Pr × (t− t1)) (5)
where Pt is the transmit power, Rx is receiving power, t1
is the connection time, and Pr is the received power. The
energy consumption for the whole network is calculated
through Eq. (6), where the signaling overhead must be
applied as well:
En = (n× c)×
[((
Sover
B
× a1
)
+ a2
)]
× Ptx× (Ctx× Crx) + (Pr × (t− t1)) (6)
where n is the count of heterogeneous cells, c is the count of
the controllers and a1 and a2 are power constants. The com-
parison results of the energy consumption of this analysis
presented in Fig. 7. According to the figure, in the network-
based model, the MU reaches to the third part that is
responsible for authentication and needs three handshakes
in a few steps. In the POW-based, more energy is consumed
on POW in comparison with our proposed approach.
The influence of the number of miners in our approach:
Here, it is assumed that the mined blocks size through the
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the energy consumption of our approach with the
network-based and POW-based models
miners are of the normal distribution, N =
(
µt, σ
2
)
and its
function is expressed through Eq. (7).
f(x) =
1
σ
√
2Π
exp
(
− (x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
(7)
The values of the parameters are µt = 150 and σ2 = 4.
The effect of increasing the miners count on the total service
demand indicates the normalized rate of the provided ser-
vice. These services include consensus-building by miners
through the DPOS algorithm and sharing information for
users and BC. Fig. 8 shows the results of this analysis.
Fig. 8. The effect of the miners on the offered service rate
The reason for the increase in the miners count is the
increase in the heterogeneous cells count in the 5G and the
possibility of further coverage of the network that is, provid-
ing more service. The more the count, the more the miners,
indicating that more delegates will collaborate to reach a
consensus, thus a reduction in the delays. An increase in µt
rate increases the demand for service because this increase
in µt increases the average size of a block ending in the
miners rewards.
Privacy efficiency preserving: In this particular analy-
sis, our approach was compared with the two SEMR-ABE
[23] and DACC [24], as shown in Table II. Te is the time
for one exponentiation, and Tc is the constant time. S is the
text code size, and f is the code attribute. In our method,
something that the user does not need is a cryptographic
operation but decryption, thus no overhead as applying the
BC properties fits 5G with less delay.
TABLE 2
Comparison of Transmission Traffic and Calculation Time of our approach with
DACC and SEMR-ABE for preserving privacy
Scheme Size of Password text Decryption time Revocation message Transfer security
DACC (3f + f)S f× Te f× S no
SEMR-ABE L2 + (f × s) + s Te Te Yes
Our method S Te Tc Yas
The efficiency of Algorithm 3 is measured in two aspects:
delay and bandwidth. In case that the source and destina-
tion are not for transferring files between adjacent cells, and
there are other heterogeneous cells among them, there are K
paths via which a SDN controller deals with the file transfer
in terms of latency, bandwidth, and data volume. Proposed
algorithm has less delay than the network-based (it does
not consider traffic and delay threshold). As illustrated in
Fig. 9, network-based increases the delay by increasing the
data size because the packets are in queue, K represents
the number of different paths in our method for sending,
and the SDN controller simultaneously sends data from
different paths to reduce transmission delay. Also, the effect
of this can cause the decrease of consuming bandwidth
during transferring packets among cells. As shown in Fig.
10, with the increase of packets transferring at the path
between source and destination in a cell, the proposed
method is more efficient than network-based as the algo-
rithm considers traffic of another cell and sends packets
through efficient path. Here we considered an average of
consumption bandwidth in the path with various K=(2,3,4).
Handover execution time: The assessment of authenti-
cation handover delays in our approach is compared with
both POW-based and network-based models. In POW-based
method, users must be registered in the blockchain and
upon repeated displacements among the cells become re-
authenticated in the cell. These two methods require re-
approval and separate protocols among heterogeneous cells
for authentication.
In our approach, the user does not need to be re-
authenticated when being replaced among the heteroge-
neous cells because they are valid in adjacent cells and
easily handover, removing the re-authentication delay. The
comparison between our authentication delay and the other
two methods based on the utilization rate in the 5G network
is shown in Fig. 11. In this context, network efficiency is
the total data volume reached the processing rates ratio
in BC and SDN controllers. The network productivity rate
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Fig. 9. The efficiency of delay measured between proposed method and
network-based model
Fig. 10. The efficiency of consumption bandwidth measured in a cell
between proposed method and network-based model
is defined as the different load conditions in the network.
When the network load is low, the authentication delay does
not have a problem in our approach and other methods. But,
when the count of the users increases and there is mobility
among the cells, and the data transmission operation is
run, the network load increases in the other two method
as opposed to our approach, which resulted in an delay less
than 1ms making it suitable for 5G.
Processing Time of Cryptographic: In this analysis, the
time spent on cryptographic is assessed with the objective
to apply Eq. (1) and algorithm 2. For this purpose, the key
transfer time must consider the cryptographic approach.
The efficiency of the cryptographic approach where the
key transfer procedure was taken into account. Except for
the mining process, an increase in transactions count, the
processing time increases in a linear manner. The mining
Fig. 11. Comparison of handover authentication of our approach
with the network-based and POW-based models
Fig. 12. Cryptographic time-out assessment through a key trans-
fer procedure
algorithm is always a mined header, containing multiple
transactions. The processing time of mining is the mean
value of multiple simulations. The processing time of DPOS
and POW are shown in Fig. 12. Due to the cooperation of
representatives (30 representatives here), DPOS reaches a
consensus in less time.
Attack model:We have considered two classes of at-
tacks.
• Class 1 attacks: DOS/DDOS attacks like, UDP Flood,
SYN Flood, TCP Flood which are common in the
network level [25].
• Class 2 attacks: Those attacks that can occur when
MU want to join cell or BC like, ID spoofing, Authen-
tication attack, Link-ability attack and Numb attack
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Fig. 13. Percentage of attack detection probability in the proposed
architecture
[26].
Attacks in class 1 usually execute by MU in cells after
joining and registering in the network for running down
infrastructure in the cells. BC and SDN controllers usually
face with attacks in class 2 since these attacks work with BC
and SDN controller directly. For example in Authentication
attack, MU frequently wants to join BC or other cells with
malicious behavior, or wants to join network with fake or
block ID for communication with other MUs. For assessing
the attack detection capability of the proposed architecture,
in the simulation we assumed that in 20 cells there were 400
MUs, 50 of which were malicious (i.e. occupying bandwidth
by sending duplicate packets) and 100 AP (20 under com-
promise and file transfer barriers). In our scenario, if AP
is compromised and the MU attacks (i.e. class 1 or class 2
attacks) inside the cell, the SDN controller is able to detect
it based on traffic generated, packet type, and consumed
bandwidth. The SDN controller is also able to detect the
attack and notify BC and other SDN controllers based on the
patterns defined by the BC or mobile operator. Also, the BC
has valid ID MU (specified by mobile operators) associated
with the registration which then can be used to detect
malicious MU. The probability of detecting an attack in the
proposed architecture during 100 times of implementation
of this scenario is shown in Fig. 13. The results shows that
the proposed approach easily detects attacks and blocks ID
them by the SDN controllers and BC.
7 RELATED WORK
The 5G network requires high capacity and efficient security
mechanisms to support data traffic [1], [27]. The concen-
tration of heterogeneous networks and vast expansion of
small base stations have led to the selection of the 5G
network [27].Many applications supported in 5G require
high privacy and reliability against malicious attacks, like
mobile banking and social network applications [28]. The
common methods for secure communications in 3G and
subsequent wireless networks are based on the controllabil-
ity and cryptographic modifications that impose constraints
and challenges for 5G [5], [27].
To support the increased data traffic, 5G networks re-
quire high capacity together with strong security mecha-
nisms. With the advent of new communication models in
5G in heterogeneous environments like vehicles [1], SDNs
[5], IoTs [6], and fog computing [1], [17]. The common
approaches to having a secure connection in 3G and sub-
sequent generations are based on cryptographic exchange
control [18], which requires different authentication servers
and protocols to support different networks and channels.
When the authentication servers are located in another
location and are remotely accessible, security challenges rise
which are not suitable for 5G [5]. According to [16], due
to the frequent displacements among cells, the existence of
repetitive authentication is inevitable which may take one-
hundredths of milliseconds to identify users, something that
would not be acceptable for 5G communications.
In [29], a 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
provided a specific presentation of hierarchical keys and
the flow of handover messages for animated scenarios.
Although there exist keys for the handovers, and different
handovers are required for different scenarios, this approach
increases the delay and the handovers complexity when
entering into different 5G cells.
An authentication handover approach was developed
by [30], including direct authentication between the user
and the AP based on public cryptography. Their proposed
mutual authentication and the key agreement does run au-
thentication according to new networks through three-way
handshake without having contact with a third part, like au-
thorized and server. Although this authentication handover
procedure seems simple, it increases the cost of computing
and delays due to the overhead it imposes for exchanging
encryption over the wireless mediators. Accordingly, the
transfer of a digital signature for the 5G wireless networks is
not effective in their approach because of exchanging more
cryptographic in overhead.
The privacy presentation for SDN / NFV base architec-
ture in 5G was discussed in [31] with a special focus on
network architectures where the core of their mobile packets
were for the SDN/NFV structure. This study was focus on
the privacy in 5G scenarios like position protection, identity
protection based on SDN/NFV, it does not assure the users
identity; thus, a challenge for the 5G. An approach for
authentication and privacy protection for the 5G small cell
vehicular was proposed in [32], where the authors specif-
ically presented the idea of a non-authorized assignment
design named CLASC that reduces the low-communications
overhead. This approach monitors road and vehicle systems
and considers the restrictions on authentication and privacy
as future tasks in the heterogeneous 5G networks.
In another work, an architecture named blockchain-
based trusted authentication (BTA), based on the chain cell
was designed for the 5G network by [33], which is being
applied through the blockchain-based anonymous access
(BAA) approach used in cloud radio over fiber network.
Despite the proposed works advantages, this study does not
discuss the handover challenges among the heterogeneous
5G networks nor their privacy protection aspects.The archi-
IEEE TRANSACTIONS JOURNAL, 2019 11
tecture of the 5G network where the fog computing and
radio access network are integrated is devised in [34]; to
achieve Privacy protection, named the F-RAN architecture.
Two loosely and highly coupled approaches for computing
functions in 5G are devised to address several privacy
attacks that identify the attack location among fog nodes
in the F-RAN architecture, which does not address the
Authentication and challenges and issues in the 5G.
The authentication handover and privacy protection in
5G networks have been discussed in [5], where the authors
have discussed the application of SDN. In this study, by
sharing users content among APs, the privacy protection
and handover are discussed. Through SDN the 5G heteroge-
neous cells are managed but sharing the users content when
a user is passing through heterogeneous networks would
lead to the different content transformation of APs, which
is followed by overhead and security challenges like data
leakage, and a delay in SDN controllers.
8 CONCLUSION
The 5G networks with heterogeneous cells and expansion
in overlay network coverage are replacing previous genera-
tions of mobile networks. A reduction in delay, which is one
of the objectives and characteristics of the 5G, is of great
importance that can happen with a solid architecture. In
this paper, with the assistance of blockchain technology and
SDN structure, a new authenticate approach was proposed
to protect the privacy of ursers in a faster, safer and more
effective manner for the advancement of the 5G network
and to provide intelligent control across heterogeneous cells.
As results indicated, by removing the repeated manipula-
tions among heterogeneous cells, low latency was obtained
for the 5G network. In addtion, with a more lightweight
blockchain, instead of applying the POW, the upgraded
DPOS consensus algorithm associated with our BC demon-
strated to be a better fit for scalability and optimized energy
consumption.
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